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TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIP AssETS RECEIVED BY A DECEASED
PARTNER AND His EsTATE - The raising of funds to pay taxes will
probably be a major problem of business men for many years to come.
Closely rivaling it, however, is the problem of computing the tax.
Though the economic definitions of income may be relatively simple,
the complex business relationships necessitating equally complex accounting procedures often make the computation of income extremely
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difficult. This was demonstrated in the recent case of H elvering v.
Enright's Estate,1 a tax case arising out of the death of a law partner.
At the time of his death there were three types of assets which had been
acquired by the firm: cash, accounts receivable, and unfinished business
for which a fee had not yet been determined. The immediate issue
was whether these items had been accrued to the decedent during his
lifetime, but the discussion opened up the problem of the correlation
of the income taxes imposed upon the decedent and those imposed
upon his estate.
Under the income tax statute a tax is levied both on the income
of the decedent up to the date of his death 2 and on the income received
by the estate during the period of settlement. 3 However, there is no
income realized on the transfer of the assets of the decedent to his
estate.4 In computing his income, a taxpayer is generally allowed to
use either a cash or accrual system of accounting. 5 The Hearn case,6
decided by the Board of Tax Appeals in 1928, illustrates that these
provisions at one time presented a loophole through which sizable
sums could escape taxation. In this case both the decedent and his
partnership were on a cash basis. During the current accounting period
before decedent's death, the partnership had earned but not collected
$14,000. As the deceased partner's executor continued to report the
decedent's income on a cash basis, the return did not show this item.
When the decedent's share was finally received, it again escaped taxation as it was not earned by the estate but was merely the liquidation
of an asset of the decedent which was already in the estate.
In section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934 7 Congress took cognizance of this loophole and provided that "amounts accrued up to the
date of his death" should be included in a decedent's income for the
1

312 U.S. 636, 61 S. Ct. 777 (1941).
"There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net
income of every individual a normal tax.••." Internal Revenue Code (1939), § II.
3 "The taxes imposed by this chapter upon individuals shall apply to the income
of estates or of any kind of property held in trust, including .•• (3) Income received
by estates of deceased persons during the period of administration or settlement of the
estate.•••" Internal Revenue Code (1939), § 161(a).
4 ''No taxable income is realized from the passage of property to the executor or
administrator on the death of the decedent..••" 2 C. C. H., FEDERAL TAX SERVICE,
§ 1138 (1941).
5 "The net income shall be computed ••. in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer•••." Internal
Revenue Code (1939), § 41.
6
Ethel D. Hearn, Admx., 9 B. T. A. 1362 (1928).
1 "In the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be included in computing net
income for the taxable period in which falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up
to the date of his death if not otherwise properly includible in. respect of such period
or a prior period." 48 Stat. L. 694 (1934), § 42, 26 U. S. C. (1934), § 42. This
provision has been retained in § 42 of the present Internal Revenue Code.
2
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period in which he died. The effectiveness of this provision depended
upon the meaning of "accrued." If it were inclusive enough, it would
completely close this leak. As an accounting term, "accrued" had
acquired a fairly restricted technical meaning which had been adopted
by the federal courts. Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis as distinguished from the cash basis had been held to mean
that, not the receipt, but the fixing of the right to receive money was
the critical event in computing income.8 This required not only the
occurrence of the event precedent to the existence of liability, such as
performance of services, but also of those events necessary to determine
the amount of the liability, such as the final determination of the fee. 9
In applying this concept in the Fehrman case,1° the Board of Tax Appeals came to the conclusion that the effect of section 42 was merely
to change the decedent from a cash to an accrual basis of accounting.
This effectively prevented the use of cash basis computations to avoid
taxation, but did not completely close the loophole as income might be
earned but not accrued, a situation which the board found to exist in
that case. There the decedent was entitled to a bonus each year based
on the yearly net profit of the store which he managed. This profit
was computed each January for the preceding year. Fehrman died in
July and, although a bonus was paid subsequently based on the proportion of the year he worked, no tax was paid on that bonus.
Even before section 42 was passed, the rule that the amount and
liability be definitely determined before income could be accrued had
not been adhered to in the case of a partnership continuing after the
death of a partner during its fiscal year. In such a case the decedent
was taxed only on that part of the total year's profits which was proportionate to the part of the year he was a member of the firm, 11 even
though disproportionate gains or losses subsequent to his death might
have substantially changed the value of his share after his death. This
exception was limited, however, to cases where the actual earnings at
the time of death could not be determined 12 and therefore should be
recognized as a rule of administrative necessity rather than one of
policy which might be extended.
With this background the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
8

Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 292 U.S. 182,
54 S. Ct. 644 (1934).
9
Schoellkopf-Aniline & Chemical Works v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1933) 3 F.
Supp. 417.
10
Lillian 0. Fehrman, Extx., 38 B. T. A. 37 (1928).
11
Darcy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 66 F. (2d)
581, cert. denied 290 U. S. 705, 54 S. Ct. 372 (1933); First Trust Co. of Omaha
v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 900.
12
People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 139.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

Circuit held, when the Enright case came before it,13 that the decedent's
share of the cash and accounts receivable could be definitely determined
and became distributable on the death of the partner and hence was
accrued. As there was then no right to receive any payment for the
unfinished business since its value had not been determined, that sum
was not yet accrued. This rule seemed consistent with the Revenue
Code and had the added advantage that it permitted the definite determination of the income of the deceased partner within a relatively
short time after his death. If there should be any escape from taxes,
the factors making it possible were sufficiently outside the control of
the taxpayer to prevent serious purposeful avoidance.
When the case came before the Supreme Court,14 however, the
circuit court was reversed as to the treatment of the item of unfinished
business. The Court expanded the meaning of "accrued" to include
everything which was "attributable to the partner's interest" and,
therefore, held that a share of the value of the unfinished business of
the firm should be included in the distributable share of the decedent.
By thus defining "accrued" the Court removed the limitations placed
on the revenue acts by the more technical definitions which had previously been followed. If followed in the future, it will mean that all
assets in excess of the capital received by a deceased partner from the
partnership must be included in the return of the decedent for the
fiscal year of his death. The Court recognized the difficulty of properly
determining the value of the assets in cases such as this, but did not feel
that it was insuperable. It was conceded that the collectibility of the
items should be considered in such a determination, as presumably
would also be permitted in regard to liquidated accounts receivable.
While the Enright case involved a partnership which was dissolved
by the death of one partner, the Court, in dicta, indicated that the
accrual would be necessary even though the state law and the articles
of partnership permitted the continuance of the partnership after
death.15
The net effect of the Enright case is to obliterate the partnership
completely for tax purposes on the death of one of the partners. This
places an especially heavy income tax burden upon partners, as earnings from several past years may have been accrued by the partnership
but for various reasons have been retained there and not made dis18 Enright's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940)
II2 F. (2d) 919.
14 Helvering v. Enright's Estate, 312 U. S. 636, 61 S. Ct. 777 (1941). Pfaff
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U. S. 646, 61 S. Ct. 783 (1941), was
decided at the same time on the basis of the reasoning of the Enright case.
16 The effect of the Enright case is also discussed in 40 M1cH. L. REV. 481
(1942).
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tributable to the partners. These earnings from past trucing periods
along with all the current earnings, some of which would ordinarily
be reported in the future, suddenly become taxable in one year and
therefore subject to higher rate brackets. The Court, however, felt that
the intent of Congress, in view of the loophole which had existed, was
clearly to tax all earnings that had not yet been reported. Congress may
not constitutionally set up an accounting system which would convert
what is not income into income by legislative fiat,16 and although lip
service has been paid to this proposition, it nowhere appears to have
been considered very seriously in this type of case. Before the Enright
case was decided, it had been thought that the use of the technical word
"accrued" indicated an intent by Congress to exclude unliquidated accounts which could not be accrued under the accounting usages then
prevalent.17 Because of the language of the Court in that case, however,
and the existing fiscal emergency, it seems likely that the Enright case
will be given full e:ffect so far as it holds that anything attributable to
the partner's interest becomes distributable upon the dissolution of the
partnership.
The broad scope of the Enright decision materially reduces the
amount of income which might formerly have been taxed in the estate
and thereby makes problems in computing the estate's income tax
relatively less important as only very rarely would an estate's income
tax be in the higher brackets. When the income taxable to the decedent has been determined, most of the difficult problems have been
decided. Even when the money paid to the estate is clearly earned after
the death of the partner, the courts have been very reluctant to consider it income to the estate. Usually the question is raised, not by the
administrator or executor of the estate, but by the surviving partners
who wish to exclude these earnings from their own incomes on the
ground that they are being distributed to the deceased partner as his
share of the partnership income under the articles. Generally the courts
hold that this is a purchase of the assets of the deceased partner by the
survivor. Hence it is a capital transaction and the income is included
in the current income of the surviving partners but not of the estate.18
The courts do not investigate the actual value of the assets received by
the survivors to determine whether there is a fair equivalent, although
apparently some assets are required in addition to good will.1 g Nor do
16 Darcy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 66 F. (2d)
581, cert. denied 290 U.S. 705, 54 S. Ct. 372 (1933).
17 50 YALE L. J. 170 (1940); I MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK
1940-41, p. 359 (1940).
18 Edwards v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 757; James
B. Brown, 10 B. T. A. 1036 (1928).
19 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S. Ct. 695 (1935).
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the facts that no specific price is set and that the amount paid is measured by or paid out of subsequent income deter the courts from designating it a capital transaction. 20
Thus in only a very few cases is the payment included in the estate's
income. In these the activity which produces the income must clearly
take place after the death of the partner and the possibility of designating it a capital transaction must, in some way, be eliminated. In the
case of Bull v. United States,21 there was no capital in the partnership
and the Court felt that the bare right of continuing the partnership
could not be capital; hence the money paid to Bull's estate under the
articles must be income to the estate. Where there was a distinct separate capital settlement, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the payments
were income and not a liquidation of capital.22 The same decision was
reached where there was no legal obligation to make the payment but
merely a desire to help the widow of the deceased partner.23
The net result of these interpretations of the present income tax
law is that all income which has in any way been acquired by a person
during his lifetime through a partnership is reported in his tax returns,
either during his life or in the final return filed for him by his representative. This achieves the ultimate aim of the income tax law. The
injustices which arise through the cumulation of income in the last
accounting period arise not so much through the unfairness of the law
in that regard as through the leniency of the law in recognizing the
mechanical imperfections of accounting systems used in ascertaining
income taxable in preceding years. From the standpoint of the individual taxpayer, it is probably at least as desirable to square his account
from his assets after his decease as to further complicate the accounting
problems involved in making his periodic returns.
Donald H. Treadwell
20 Lawrence W. Zonsius, 3 C. C.H., FEDERAL TAX SERVICE,
Benedict v. Price, (D. C. N. Y. 1929) 38 F. (2d) 309.
21 295 U. S. 247, 55 S. Ct. 695 (1935).
22 Richard P. Hallowell, 2nd, 39 B. T. A. 50 (1939).
23 Loe M. Randolph Peyton, 44 B. T. A., No. 195 (1941).

1f 7461-B (1941);

